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WRITING COMPETITION 2004-2005 
S. MEREDITH MORRIS 
On Miranda and Misinterpretation: A Look at the Rights of Native American 
Defendants 
On Miranda and Misinterpretation: 
A Look at the Rights of Native American ~efendantsl 
The methods we employ i n  the  enforcement' o f  our criminal iaw have a p t l y  
been c a l l e d  the measures b y  which the q u a l i t y  o f  our 
c i v i l i z a t i o n  may be  judged. 
Intro 
When I attended college in New Orleans, Louisiana, I 
volunteered at a poverty law center made famous by Sister 
Helen Prejean, the author of Dead Man Walking. It was 
located in the St. Thomas Projects, which have now been 
replaced by a WALMART. During the course of my volunteer 
work, the attorneys for the center required that everyone 
in the office attend a workshop about race and racism. The 
objective was revealing what is called aversive racism or 
unconscious racism along with other culturally complex and 
' The author is aware that many indigenous people who live in the United States prefer the term "American 
Indian" to the term 'Wative American." Still many indigenous people in the U.S. prefer to use their specific 
tribal affiliation. 
7 -  
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'mppZ@e v. Uriited3aTess, 369~U.S1;138, &@ 0962). ~p 
equally deep-seated-many times subconscious-bigotry.4 After 
the workshop, I became involved with an organization in New 
Orleans focused on race issues and semi-radical efforts to 
raise community awareness. This group created bumper 
stickers promoting a very clever hybridized word, which 
appeared in black lettering over an American flag. 
"Eracism" it read. I sent these bumper stickers to all my 
friends, proudly handed them out and lauded the bookstores 
that sold them. My intentions were truly good. My actions 
were based on my most fundamental belief that all people 
should have equal opportunity and justice within reach. The 
process of researching and writing this essay moved me to 
peel that sticker off my truck. I am about to inform you 
about my bold step: the removal of a statement I thought I 
believed in whole-heartedly. 
Come to find out,   racism' is a term used by Critical 
Race Theorists to mean the removal of race, and a history 
of subjugation 'from the books", from the law and from our 
daily interactions by remaining silent or actively re- 
writing history. It is the process and practice of eliding 
race and class from discourse, watering-down controversy 
and omitting injustice by erasing a history of hostility, 
subjugation, slavery and hatred. It is a product, and, in 
turn, the perpetuation, of a hegemonic6 legacy founded in 
privileged race-ignorance, by "ignoring" the 
disenfranchisement of entire groups of people. 
In this paper, I posit that the Miranda ruling from the 
infamous case Miranda v.  ~rizona', when poorly applied, 
results in profound and blatant Eracism. Under Miranda the 
Supreme Court melded the Fifth Amendment of the United 
I See Francis Jennings, The Invasion ofAmerica (University of North Carolina Press 1975). 'The invaders 
also anticipated, correctly, that other Europeans would question the morality of their enterprise. They 
therefore prepared. .. quantities of propaganda to overflow their own countrymen's scruples. The 
propaganda gradually took standard from as an ideology with conventional assumptions and semantics. We 
live with it still." 
Eracism is "The omission of references to or acknowledgment of racial issues that either implicitly of 
explicitly present themselves." Margaret Montoya, Silence and Silencing: The Centripetal and Cenhjiugai 
Forces in Legal Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 847,898 (2000). Also, 
Montoya quotes Dirk Tillotson on Constitutional Eracism, "a rewriting of our shared history as an 
exclusive and ostensibly objective 'perspectiveless' text. It is a dangerous form of historical revisionism 
that seeks to deny the standing of certain groups. It elevates the history of some and denies that of others." 
See Montoya's footnote 259. "If we forget the great stain.. . that stands at the heart of our country, our 
history, our experiment-we forget who we are, and we make the great rift deeper and wider." Ken Bums, 
"Mystic Chords of Memory" from a speech delivered at the University of Vermont, September 12, 1991. 
Hegemony from the Greek hegemonia, from hegemon leader, kom hegeisthai to lea: preponderant 
influence or authority over others. 
7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
States with a Sixth amendment-like privilege to have an 
attorney present at an interrogation. The Court then handed 
down Miranda,  complete with a new set of procedural 
rules/guides for suspects and cops, which did not alter the 
Constitution but sought to uphold it. The Miranda Rule was 
created to protect the citizens of America; it was to 
protect suspects from coercion during custodial 
interrogations. What was originally a good idea has turned 
into a farce, because the Supreme Court was apparently 
oblivious to the cultural composition of America at the 
time and did not consider how the population would grow, 
change and become increasingly diverse. Miranda was written 
by economically privileged justices,' to be most often 
applied to poor and under-privileged suspects who are often 
minorities and many times uneducated- people who know next 
to nothing about the legal system in the United States. 
I will begin Part I by stepping back in history to look 
at the evolution of Miranda and the cases that followed. 
Next, I take a look at the 2000 Census data and address the 
relatively current minority population percentages. Then, 
in Part 11, I dissect Miranda, revealing what "custody" and 
"interrogation", the "right to an attorney" and "valid 
waiver" mean according to the Supreme Court. As I 
scrutinize each of these four terms or concepts, I 
elucidate the misapplication of these ideas by exposing how 
they play out in cases where the suspects or defendants are 
Native American. For each of these concepts I attach a 
federal circuit court case, where each defendant appealed 
based on the belief that his Miranda rights were violated. 
In Part I11 of this paper, I take a deeper look at how 
language and culture interact and intersect with Miranda.  
Language and culture have profound impact on the outcome of 
Miranda cases. Miranda analysis is affected on every level 
by the suspect's cultural perspective. Background and 
heritage can alter the way in which a suspect understands 
custody, waiver, what rights he/she has, how to interact 
with the police, when a formal interrogation has begun and 
8 The police model ofjustice is based upon power, force and authority. It is a "vertical" system of law, 
which used hierarchical institutions to keep order. Such a vertical system is comprised of federal and state 
law using a system of rules made by legislatures, interpreted by courts, and applied by enforcers and 
decision-makers. Many times it seems as thought the rules are not made by ordinary people but by the elite, 
often elected to a legislature because their members have a lot of money or access to it though campaign 
contributions. Oftentimes, many of the police officers assigned to poor areas are not 60m the community, 
and very often it is the more wealthy and educated Americans who become lawyers and judges. "The 
Honorable Justice Yazzie, "Hozho NabasdliY- WE ARE NOWIN GOOD RELATIONS: The Navajo 
Restorative Justice, St. Thomas Law Review, 118 (Fall 1996). 
how to ask for an attorney. A suspect's cultural 
understanding of those issues has a substantial effect on 
the outcome of the interrogation and, ultimately, the 
outcome of the trial or plea. While it may sound dramatic, 
the result is a form of ethn~cide.~ By rejecting 
modifications on the "reasonable person" standard, and 
failing to consider the cultural background of a defendant, 
the court fosters repression of cultural differences and 
deems minority defendants subordinate or inadequate. It is 
the system's unspoken commitment to "reducing the Other to 
the Same ... the dissolution of the multiple into one... the 
inclination to refuse the multiple, the fear and horror of 
difference."1° It is the authoritarian suppression of socio- 
cultural diversity; it is the process of standardizing. 
In Part IV, I move on to discuss solutions to the 
problems resulting under Miranda and what some 
jurisdictions in the United States are doing to remedy 
these problems. I explore legal and educational options and 
solutions. The dominant culture in America is unconscious 
and oblivious to discrimination (and the benefits that come 
with being white) and inherently racist. Therefore, I 
propose that attorneys and judges, police officers and FBI 
agents need to be educated on the critical relationship 
between cultural heritage/ understanding/ interpretation 
and the outcome of Miranda cases. I insist that 
interrogations be videotaped and that attorneys be 'on 
call" and available so that an attorney is present for 
every interrogation. I suggest that the right to a licensed 
interpreter be added to the Miranda language. I conclude 
with a plea for education on Constitutional rights, for a 
strong movement of Native American Critical Race Theorists 
and more cultural studies and cultural competency training. 
Ethnocide: a blending of the word ethnic or  ethno- and the s u f f i  -tide. Ethnic comes from Middle 
English, from the Latin ethnicus and from the Greek ethnikos meaning "national" and from ethnos meaning 
"nation or people." The root is similar to the Greek ethos or custom. a. Of or relating to large groups of 
people classed according to common racial, national, tribal, religious, linguistic, or cultural origin or 
background b: being a member of an ethnic group -cide The suftix comes from French and is derived from 
the Latin -cida "killer," and from Latin -cidiunl "killing," both from Latin caedere "to strike, 
kill."l. Killer, as in a fungicide and patricide or, 2. Killing as it1 tyrannicide. Essentially the hybridization of 
the two suggests the killing of culture, ethnicity, custom, and tradition. 
'O John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice By Restoring the Great 
Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5 Great Plains National 
Resources Journal 40,83 (2001) (quoting Pierre Clashes, Society Against the State 198 (Robert Hurley & 
Abe Stein trans., Zone Books 1987). 
I 
On Miranda 
The Background and History of Miranda 
Before Miranda, suspects were interrogated in private 
and attorneys were not allowed to sit in on interrogation 
proceedings. Police brutality and intense coercion were 
rampant and fully accepted." Around the middle part of the 
twentieth century, the judiciary decided to target violent 
and reprehensible police practices used to obtain 
confessions. There was a shift in strategy and the police 
began to use psychological subterfuge and complex 
manipulation as a means of securing confessions. Many 
people found these methods to be just as abhorrent. 
Tyrannical and totalitarian as these methods were, the 
authors of the police manuals defended their work, 
proclaiming their necessity in interrogation. The justices 
of the Supreme Court were not satisfied. Confessions, 
derived from trickery and devious technique, were seen as 
"darkly the product of police coercion."12 The Court 
maintained that a fine balance had to be reached in every 
interrogation. Slowly, the Court moved to protect 
vulnerable suspects "minorities and the poor-by informing 
them of their rights and empowering them against coercive 
tactics. "l" 
The Court had long been disgruntled with the case-by- 
case evaluation of confessions and the application of the 
"voluntariness test" that preceded Miranda.14 There was a 
need for clarification and a bright-line rule. In a case 
titled Malloy v. Hogan,15 the Court held that the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was fundamental 
and applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Then in Escobedo v. ~llinois,'~ the Court extended the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel so that it applied to pre- 
indictment interrogations. Defendant's statements were 
considered inadmissible if they were gathered in violation 
I I See generally Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure (Lexis Nexis 2002). 
12 Gerald M. Caplan, QuestioningMiranda, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1417, 1425 (1985). 
13 Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Comell L. Rev. 109, 125 (1998). See also Raymond D. 
Austin, ADR and the Navajo Peacemaker Court, Judges' Journal (Spring 1993). "When asked if another 
Navajo will do something.. . a tribe member will reply, "it is up to him." Navajos do not believe in making 
decisions for others. Navajo common law rejects coercion This creates difficulties for any legal system, 
which is built upon coercion, authority, and levels of power, such as the adversary system." 
Again see Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Procedure ( Lexis Nexis 2002). 
I5 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1994). 
l6 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
of the right to counsel. If one was to distill the essence 
of Escobedo, and follow its rule in earnest, "all police 
interrogation should be prohibited until the defendant has 
had an opportunity to consult with an attorney."17 Then came 
Miranda . 
In 1966, via the famous and controversial case Miranda 
v. Arizona, the Supreme Court ruled that all suspects must 
be informed of their Constitutional rights to both silence 
and counsel when they are held in custody for 
interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona was a case comprised of 
four consolidated cases brought on appeal. The police 
practices under scrutiny involved departments in four 
different jurisdictions, but the conditions were much the 
same in each scenario. All four suspects had been taken 
into custody, and each was questioned in an interrogation 
room. In each circumstance, the interrogation took place in 
a police dominated environment. All four suspects were 
alone with the interrogators. None of the suspects were 
informed of their Fifth Amendment right against self- 
incrimination. Thus, this case was the genesis of Miranda 
Warnings, now so prevalent in the media, glorified on Law 
and Order and Cops. Ironically, when Ernesto Miranda was 
killed in a bar fight ten years after the Miranda decision 
was handed down, the suspect for his murder was one of many 
beneficiaries of the Miranda ruling; he received Miranda 
warnings. 
The Substance and Alteration of Miranda 
UThe recipients of police warnings are often frightened suspects 
unlettered in the law, not lawyers or judges or others schooled in 
interpreting legal or semantic nuance. Such suspects can hardly be 
expected to interpret, in as facile a manner as the Chief Justice, 'the 
pretzel-like warnings here--intertwining, contradictory and ambiguous as 
they are. '" Justice ~arshall" 
The Miranda rule was a judicially created measure, a 
mechanism, derived from the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States, which provides 'no person ... shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself ."lg The 
Fifth Amendment privilege, originally only functional in 
the courtroom but applied in the police station, gives 
17 Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 Tulsa L.J. 
1,9  (1995). 
Duckworth v. Eagan, 109 S.  Ct. 2875, 2887(l989)(Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 484 Pa. 349,356,399 A. 2d 11 1,115 (1979). 
19 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
suspects under custodial police interrogation two express 
substantive rights, created to protect suspects in 
inevitably coercive police dominated environments. Once in 
custody, and before interrogation, a suspect must be 
informed of his/her right to remain silent and right to 
have counsel present, whether the attorney is retained or 
appointed. If a suspect invokes his/her right to silence, 
the police interrogation must end immediately. Any 
statement given by the suspect after the invocation of 
his/her rights is presumed coerced, unless the suspect 
'knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives his 
previously invoked right to silence."20 Furthermore, if a 
suspect states that he/she wishes to have the aid of an 
attorney, the interrogation must end until counsel is 
present or the suspect 'initiates" conversation, with the 
police. Again, the suspect must knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligently waive the right to an attorney. In some 
states, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily and 
intelligentl~.~' Under federal law, the government bears the 
same responsibility of proof, but with a lower standard: 
preponderance of the evidence. 22 
Today the Miranda opinion is still alive, even though 
the Supreme Court had the opportunity to overrule it in 
Dickerson v. United But Miranda is no longer in 
its original form; it has been described as 'twisting 
slowly in the wind."24 Ideally, the Fifth Amendment is 
effectuated by the procedural precautions provided by 
Miranda. Ideally, Miranda should protect citizens from 
police pressure and coercion. However, the Supreme Court 
has further illustrated how Miranda should apply, in the 
cases listed below, and has created many exceptions to the 
Miranda rule. The application and interpretation have been 
narrow. The potential for positive impact has been 
abandoned. The rights have been diluted. For example, in 
New York v. Q~arles,~~ the Court decided that "overriding 
considerations of public safety" might excuse the police 
for not advising suspects of their rights. In Michigan v. 
Har~ey,'~ the Court held that while statements taken in 
20 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,483 (1981). 
21 See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412,421 (1986); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U S .  298 (1985); Colorado v. 
S ring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987). 
"See generally Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure (Lexis Nexis 2002). 
23 Dickerson v. UnitedStates, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
" Arthur J. Goldberg, Escobedo and Miranda Revisited, 18 Akron L. Rev. 177, 182 (1984). 
"New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
26 Michigan v. Harvey, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990). 
violation of Miranda cannot be used in the government's 
case in chief, they could be used to impeach defendants who 
testify at trial. In California v. ~ r y s o c k , ~ ~  the Court held 
that Miranda warnings need not be given in any specific 
way. Additionally, circuit and state courts have helped to 
dilute and dissolve Miranda's substance. According to the 
Tenth Circuit, 'No talismanic incantation is required to 
satisfy its  stricture^."^^ The Tenth Circuit has also held 
the translation of Miranda warnings need not be perfect but 
merely "convey the gist of the rights."29 The government is 
not constitutionally required to employ or make available a 
certified interpreter during a police interrogation, and it 
is not unconstitutional for a police officer to serve as an 
interpreter. 30 
The rights created by the Fifth Amendment, and given 
shape by Miranda, are distinct from other substantive 
rights in that they must be invoked before they can be 
e~ercised.~' If an individual 'desires the protection of the 
privilege, he must claim it or he will not be considered to 
have been 'compelled' within the meaning of the 
~mendment."~' In other words, the Miranda construct does not 
impede the volunteering of an individual's statement. 
Miranda simply provides judicially created "magic words" in 
an attempt to arm citizens (or pretend to) with the power 
to invoke of the Fifth Amendment. Its purpose is to prevent 
against police compelled self-incrimination and to ensure 
that statements given post-Miranda warnings are, almost 
without exception, valid and thus admissible. There are 
some tricks to the art of invocation: 1) A suspect must be 
very clear when evoking his/her rights. Without the "magic 
words," Miranda rights cannot take effect. 2) The suspect 
must be in custody and under formal interrogation. If the 
suspect is not in formal custody or under formal 
interrogation, their statements, with or without Miranda, 
are admissible. If Miranda rights are not validly waived, a 
confession/statement cannot be brought as evidence at 
trial. 
The faces of Amarica: What the Supreme Court did not 
Consider in Miranda 
" California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1991). 
" Id. at 359. 
29 US. v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1990). 
' O  Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d 797,803 (Mass. 1990). 
" Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 101-04 (1975). 
32 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420,427 (1984) (quoting United Stales v. Monia, 317 U.S. 427(1943)). 
America is a cultural montage, a combination of 
immigrant culture and indigenous culture mixed with the 
still-too-dominant white Euro-based culture. The cultural 
attributes of all these assorted and varied groups have a 
deep influence on American society. Consequently, culture, 
sense of self-identification, race, ethnicity, religion and 
language profoundly influence the perceptions and responses 
of persons in the legal system and specifically under 
interrogation. When the Supreme Court wrote the Miranda 
opinion, the country was at the precipice of major change 
due to a massive wave of immigration. Between 1969 and 
1989, twelve million people legally immigrated to the 
United States, mostly from Latin America and Asia. 33 
According to the statistics of the United States 
Census Bureau, in the year 2000, at least twenty five 
percent of the American population is non-White. Of this 
twenty five percent, Native Americans and Alaska Natives 
make up 1%, combined with 12.3% African American, 3.7% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 12.5% Hispanic/Latino. The other 
7.9% classified themselves as "other," or a combination of 
"two or more races." As documented by the 2000 Census, 18% 
of the United States population speaks a non-English 
language in their home. Of the 18%, 23% report they do not 
speak English well, or do not speak English at all. Though 
the minority population of America embodies only 25%, 
minorities make up at least 64% of the prison population in 
the U.S.34 
The Supreme Court failed to acknowledge and foresee 
the composition of this country's population. But after 
Miranda it didn't take long before the courts were forced 
to address the application of Miranda to people from 
varying cultures-spanning the gambit. While Miranda was 
written with the goal of limiting coercion and protecting 
vulnerable criminal suspects, failing to recognize cultural 
difference in its application has aided in maintaining the 
power of the dominant white culture. As a judicial tool, 
Miranda merely serves in imposing a false norm, and 
consequently disempowers minorities. If a suspect does not 
understand his/her rights-because of cultural and 
linguistic difficulties-the Miranda waiver may be suspect. 
Thus, when a non-English speaking suspect or a suspect from 
33 Phillip Q. Yang, Post-1965 Immigration to the UnitedStates 15 (1995). 
'4 Census data can be found on the web: 
httD:llwww.usatodav.com/maohicsicensus20OO/~iteds~tes/s~te.h~ 
a different culture makes a confession, misinterpretation 
is of major concern. Language and culture are critical 
elements in determining the validity of a waiver. Who could 
be more vulnerable than suspects who do not speak English 
or are unfamiliar with the United States legal system? Yet, 
in applying Miranda, the courts rarely take the suspect's 
cultural reality into account. 
I1 
The Miranda Rule Applied t o  Native American Suspects 
The United States government has made every possible 
effort to force assimilation on Native American Indians. As 
author Robert Grey Eagle explains: 
They took our land and put us in prisons 
called reservations. They tried to exter- 
minate us. Next came ethnocide when they 
tried to take our language and religion 
from us. They tried to strip us of our 
identity. It has amounted to the genocide 
of our culture, and the results have been 
disastrous. l5 
Robert Grey Eagle describes a disaster that continues today 
through the application of Miranda analysis-without deep 
consideration of a suspect's cultural background and 
heritage-is a continuation of the disaster Robert Grey 
Eagle describes. The following cases will expose a grave 
potential for injustice, ethnocide and continued 
imprisonment. The outcomes of these cases are real and 
relevant and have a notable impact on Native American 
communities. It is important to qualify that I am not 
asserting that defendants in these cases are "right" or 
that their arguments are perfectly sound or consistently 
well grounded. It is impossible to know the specifics of 
each case, based on the courts' opinions (which omit some 
of the most essential information) to reach such 
conclusions. Still, reading the cases closely helps to 
raise questions and cause us to dare to ask for-and demand- 
more information and a more just application of Miranda. 36 
As Miranda gives rise to a great deal of ambiguity and 
35 John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice By Restoring the Great 
Grasslancis and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5 Great Plains National 
Resources Journal 40,83 (2001), (quoting Robert Grey Eagle, quoted in John Carlson, South Dakota 
Indians Want TheirLand Back, Des Moines Reg., Jan. 26, 1992. at I.) 
36 ''The history of a nation is, unfortunately, too easily written as the history of its dominant class." 
See Kwame N h m a h  Conscientism 63 (Monthly Review Press 1964). 
10 
uncertainty, the opinion generates some simple questions 
with complex answers. It is important to ask them: When is 
a person in custody? When is a suspect under interrogation? 
How does one sufficiently and unambiguously request an 
attorney? Has Miranda been waived and what constitutes a 
valid waiver? 
l . D o n r t  worry; you're not in Custody. 
A suspect is in custody as soon as 'a suspect's 
freedom is curtailed to a degree associated with formal 
arrest."37 However, the Court has followed a very literal 
definition of custody. Miranda does not typically apply 
outside of the police station, many times does not apply 
within.38 In determining whether an individual was in 
custody at the time of the interrogation, the court looks 
to the circumstances of the interrogation and considers how 
a "reasonable man" would have interpreted the situation. 
This is a source of substantial injustice. You may be 
asking, "Who is this reasonable man and why haven't I met 
him?" This is because he does not exist. He is a judicial 
construct, and the men who thought him up were white. "Now 
their ideas about meaning, action and fairness are built 
into our culture ... their subjectivity long ago was deemed 
"objective" and imposed on the world."39 
Custody, in essence, is not determined by the 
subjective views of the police officers and suspects, but 
by the objective circumstances involved in the 
interrogation. This objective standard attempts to 
eliminate subjectivity that would lead to suspects claiming 
they believed they were in custody, when in fact they were 
not, and help define a set standard for the police.40 But in 
doing so, this standard merely sustains and upholds the 
power of the dominant white culture and white hegemony. 
Judging suspects belonging to minority and disadvantaged 
cultures by the values and standards of the dominant 
culture can lead to discrimination and unjust application 
of the law. "This lack of recognition of the idiosyncrasies 
of different cultures maintains the power of the majority 
and disempowers those in the min~rity."~' Thus, the 
37 Berkmer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,440 (1984); Stansbury v. California, 51 1 U.S. 318 at 322 (1994). 
38 For more, Joshua Dressier, Understanding Criminal Procedure (Lexis Nexis 2002). 
39 Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power. 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813,819 (1992). Also, 
consider William F. Buckiey, Jr. who said, "History is the polemics of the victor." 
40 Berkmer, at 440. Stansbuiy, at 322. 
41 Delgado, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813 at 818. 
"objective standard" is often an unfair standard that 
rejects not only the suspect but also reality. Underlying 
these standards "is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, 
one neatly concealed in elaborate arg~ments."~~ Based on 
this tradition of objectivity, derived from ~urocentric~~ 
ideology, inherently racist in its foundation, the court 
ignores cultural factors and the suspect's cultural 
prospective thereby maintaining a superficial norm and 
testing the suspect based on this norm. I maintain that the 
court is then detached from the actual state of things when 
there is no alteration of the "reasonable man" standard. 
The examples that follow show what happens, in reality, to 
Native Americans within the criminal justice system. 
A l b e r t  D e a n  B e g a y  
In a Tenth Circuit case, U.S. v. B e g a ~ , ~ ~  a young 
Navajo man appealed his conviction by arguing that his 
written confession should not have been admitted in to 
evidence. Begay was convicted for burglary of a store in 
Shiprock, New Mexico, on Indian land. A FBI agent met with 
Begay (who was nineteen years old at the time) at his home, 
and expressed a desire to speak with Begay about the 
burglary. The FBI agent stated that they could speak at 
Begay's home or at the police station. Begay chose the 
police station and the agent drove Begay there. Begay was 
not advised of his rights at this time, but he did not 
speak to the agent during the drive. At the station Begay 
was advised of his rights and waived them before making the 
statement later used in the trial court, despite Begay's 
motion to suppress. The motion was denied for two reasons: 
1) the court held the defendant was not in custody at the 
time of his interrogation 2) the court found the FBI agent 
had properly advised Begay of his rights. 45 
On appeal, Begay maintained that his confession was 
involuntary because of the "inherent pressures of the 
interrogation atm~sphere."~~ The Tenth Circuit was not 
persuaded by this argument. Begay's "subjective background" 
"Delgado, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813 at 817. Consider also James Zion, The Dynamics ofNavajo 
Peacemaking, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 14 No. 1, February 1998 58-74. See note 3. 
"As Mary Shirley, a Navajo lawyer, once put it, 'You Anglos always have reasons for everything. Don't 
you know that some things just are?"' 
Eurocentric: centered on Europe or the Europeans, reflecting a tendency to interpret the world in tenns 
of western and especially European values and experiences. 
44 United States v. Begay, 441 F.2d 1 136 (lorn Cir. 1971). 
'' Id. at 1137. 
46 Begay, 441 F.2d 1136, 1137. 
was not to be ~onsidered.~~ The court noted that Begay gave 
his statement free of coercion as he was "nineteen, 
attended school midway through the eleventh grade, was a 
good student, spoke English fluently and gave no indication 
of incapability to under~tand."~' The court concluded that 
Begay's confession was voluntary and, thus, did not 
readdress the issue of custody, even though being 
questioned in a police station is much like (if not 
equivalent to) a true interrogation, especially since Begay 
had no means of leaving the station. The court did not 
consider whether the defendant might have believed-as a 
reasonable teenager uncomfortable around FBI agents would- 
that he was in custody when he was driven by a FBI agent, 
in the agent's car, to the police station and was 
thoroughly questioned at the station. 
2.Donrt worry; you have the right to an attorney. 
The invocation of one's Fifth Amendment Right to 
Counsel is a procedural pause button. If a suspect in the 
midst of custodial interrogation requests the aid or 
presence of an attorney, the interrogation 'must cease 
until an attorney is present."49 Furthermore, the police may 
not resume questioning a suspect who has consulted with an 
attorney. Counsel must be present for questioning to 
proceed, unless the suspect initiates conversation with the 
police regarding a separate crime or waives his/her rights, 
the police must remain paused. 
Pretty powerful, isn't it? The suspect has control. 
The police are subordinate to these very powerful magic 
words. But here's the glitch, the court requires that the 
request be "unambiguous," which disadvantages suspects who 
may not know how to communicate an unambiguous request for 
counsel. As when parents require the magic words "please" 
or "thank you" a child must use the correct expression or 
yield no power and achieve few results. Like a secret code, 
one has to be in on the secret. The suspect's request 
cannot be vague. Rather, he/she must articulate his/her 
request to have counsel present "sufficiently clearly that 
a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would 
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."50 
If the request is in any way vague or uncertain, the police 
"Id. 
48 Id. 
"Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,482 (1981) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). 
50 See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 (1990). 
may proceed with the interrogation. They need not clarify 
the suspect's request by asking questions of the suspect or 
explaining the suspect's options/rights further; such 
behavior is not expected or req~ired.~' 
Many Americans, even those brought up with substantial 
privilege and a strong education, would not know to be so 
precise in order to rouse their Fifth Amendment right to 
counsel. What about those who are not familiar with the 
system, not privileged, not educated? This so-called 
"protection" under Miranda discriminates against those who 
are unfamiliar with the legal system in the United States 
or who lack the vocabulary to articulate their request to 
the law enforcement. Miranda discriminates against those 
who, for whatever reason, do not know how or cannot express 
or articulate an ''unequivocal request." They are the very 
people the Supreme Court sought to protect with Miranda. 
As Justice Souter stated in his concurring opinion in 
Dav i s ,  'Criminal suspects ... thrust into an unfamiliar 
atmosphere and... menacing police interrogation ... would seem 
an odd group to single out for the Court's demand for 
heightened linguistic care."'' Souter solidifies his 
statement by adding, 'a substantial percentage of them lack 
anything like a confident command of the English language ... 
when overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament ... 
the ability to speak assertively will abandon 
Many Native Americans feel very powerless and 
disenfranchised in the white-hegemony of American culture. 54 
The colonization of America (the attempted removal of 
tradition, culture, identity and lifestyle) killed, wounded 
and isolated the native populous of this country. What 
remains is a deep-and exceedingly legitimate-distrust of 
the United States government. The likelihood of Native 
American citizens speaking up and asserting their rights 
during a custodial interrogation is pretty slim. Native 
" U.S. v. Davis, 512 U.S. 452,459 (1994); U. S. v. Muhammad, 120 F.3d 688,698 (7' Cu. 1997); Diaz v. 
Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61,63 (1996) (holding "Do you think I need a lawyer?" was not an unambiguous 
request) also, Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (7' Cir. 1994) (holding that "I can't afford a 
lawyer, but is there any way I can get one?" was not an unambiguous request for counsel). 
" Davis, 5 12 U.S. 5 12 at 469-70 (Souter, J., concurring). 
'' Id. at 461. 
'* See James Zion, The Dynamics ofNavajo Peacemaking, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 
14 No. 1, February 1998 58-74,62. 'The crime picture is the product of the internal colonialism of 
American Indian policy, which produced social disorganization, culture conflict, a subculture of violence, 
economic deprivation, and alcohol dependence. Such pressures on distinct people create.. .lawlessness that 
is a product of extreme stress and the disruption of traditional life."(Quoting R. Bachmsn, Dearh and 
Violence on the Reservation (Auburn House 1992). 
American defendants are unlikely to feel any sense of 
entitlement, empowerment or exhibit the kind of behavior 
the court demands, based entirely on Western and primarily 
Eurocentric standards. Police custody can exacerbate an 
already strong sense of powerlessness and increase the 
likelihood of resistant silence or unequivocal speech. 
Additionally, it is difficult for persons unfamiliar with 
the Western legal system invoke a right he/she does not 
know exists. How can a suspect make a firm request when 
they fear it may be interpreted as disrespectful or 
dangerous? Also how can a person speak with certainty when 
at the mercy of the police who are known to be extremely 
coercive and representative of a system that is not worthy 
of trust? To answer these questions, we must continue to 
dissect the problems exhibited in case law, and delve below 
the surface. 
Ross Allen Doherty 
In U. S. v. ~ohert~, 55 a Native American defendant and 
resident of Hannahville Indian Community tribal reservation 
was convicted on two counts of knowingly engaging in sexual 
acts with a child.56 Doherty was arraigned in the 
Hannahville Indian Community Tribal court. There he was 
informed that he had the right to retain counsel at his own 
expense and was asked if he wished to have an attorney. 
Doherty responded in affirmation; he stated that his mother 
was attempting to obtain a lawyer at that time. Implied in 
his statement was his clear desire to have an attorney. 
While in tribal custody in the tribal police station, 
a FBI agent visited Doherty, knowing that Doherty's alleged 
tribal court violation was also in violation of federal 
law.57 Doherty agreed to speak with the federal agent. He 
was informed of his rights, including the right to have an 
appointed lawyer paid for by the government, a right he did 
not have in tribal court. Doherty signed a waiver and 
indicated that he understood his rights and was willing to 
voluntarily proceed. He admitted to sexually abusing his 
two stepdaughters many times over the last seven years. 
Doherty's motion to suppress the confession was denied by 
the district court, and the FBI agent read his confession 
into evidence. 
55 U. S. v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6" Cir. 1997). 
56 Id. 
" S e e  the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1867). 
Doherty appealed to the Sixth Circuit arguing a 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. Doherty maintained 
that his statement in tribal court, regarding his mother's 
efforts to obtain legal counsel, was a request for an 
attorney under Miranda. He further argued that the FBI 
agents should have ceased their questioning as it proceeded 
in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to have an 
attorney present during interrogation. The court found that 
the FBI agents 'carefully explained to Doherty his rights, 
and Doherty voluntarily elected to proceed with the 
inter vie^."^' Doherty based his argument on Edwards v .  
Ari~ona,~~ stating that once a suspect has invoked his Fifth 
Amendment Right to Counsel, any Miranda waiver that follows 
is, as a matter of law, involuntary. He further argued that 
there are only two exceptions to the Edward's rule: (1) a 
suspect's counsel is present or (2) the suspect initiates 
the conversation. 
The court held that all of this was irrelevant because 
under Edwards the suspect must "unambiguously request 
counsel"60 for the Fifth Amendment to take effect. Judge 
Boggs expressly stated in his opinion, " Although a suspect 
need not speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don, he 
must articulate his desire to have counsel present 
sufficiently clearly.,. If the statement fails to meet the 
requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that 
the officers stop questioning the suspect."61 The court 
concluded, regarding Doherty's Fifth Amendment rights that 
the rule of Edwards "applies only when the suspect has 
expressed his wish for the particular sort of lawyerly 
assistance that is the subject of Miranda."62 According to 
the Sixth Circuit, requesting counsel at his arraignment in 
tribal court was not within the ordinary meaning of a 
'request for counsel" under Miranda and Edwards. 
3. Don't worry; this isn't an interrogation. 
If the court determines that an officer's statement to/ questioning 
of a suspect did not equal interrogation, 
then the suspect's words and responses are admis~ible.~~ 
58 Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 at 769. 
59 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,482 (1981). 
60 Doherty, at 775, quoting Edwards v. Arizona, supra. 
6' Id. at 482. 
"Id. at 774. 
63 United States v. Moreno-Flares, 33 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9' Cir. 1994). 
Under Miranda, interrogation is defined as "clear, 
deliberate questioning or its functional equivalent."64 The 
functional equivalent, the Court explains, would be 'any 
words or actions on the part of the police that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response."65 Therefore, in determining whether 
an interrogation has transpired, the court will take the 
intent of the police into consideration, but will mainly 
focus on the understanding of the suspect and his/her 
per~eption.~~ The police are not expected to take each 
person's subtle character/cultural traits into 
consideration at the time of the interrogation. However, if 
the police know a suspect is sensitive or vulnerable the 
police must not exploit that vulnerability by using a 
'particular form of per~uasion"~' likely to bring about such 
a response. If the police know a suspect's cultural 
heritage makes him/her vulnerable due to cultural fear of 
authority, unfamiliarity with the system, lack of fluency 
in English, or specific nationality, they should then 
consider if their words or activities would be likely to 
invoke an incriminating response from the suspect. The 
following case is an example of such a situation. 
Daniel Chalan 
In another Tenth Circuit case,68 a witness identified 
the defendant, Daniel Chalan from Cochiti pueblo, as a 
robber of a convenience store and murderer of an employee. 
At trial, the principal evidence used to convict Chalan was 
his confession, made on the day of his arrest. The 
confession was allowed into evidence because Chalan was 
deemed to have not been in custody when he answered FBI 
agents' questions at the request of his tribal governor, in 
the governor's office. As there was no obvious use or 
threat of force exercised to compel Chalan to answer the 
FBI agents' questions or keep him in the governor's office, 
the questioning was not considered an interrogation under 
Miranda. The court held that Chalan's Indian status and 
deep sense of obligation to obey the tribal governor did 
not convert the period of questioning into a custodial 
interrogation. The court held this, regardless of the 
presence of Chalan's mother, two investigators, and an 
* Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966). 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 444. 
" ~ h o d e  ~sland v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,301 (1980). 
67innis, 446 U.S. 291 at 302. 
United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10' Cir. 1987). 
17 
officer from the county sheriff's office, the governor 
himself in addition to the FBI agents, throughout the 
questioning. Some of the officers were clearly armed, and 
Chalan was clearly outnumbered. 
In the tribal governor's office, Chalan was asked 
several questions related to the events at the convenience 
store. He was asked about his involvement in an 'often 
accusatory" manner.69 He was "exhorted to tell the truth" by 
all of the people present during the inter vie^.^' Still, the 
court notes that no one threatened Chalan, harmed him 
physically or forced him to stay. Chalan denied any 
involvement or activity in the murder/robbery. A day later, 
after talking about the murder and robbery with several of 
his cousins (who were later given the privilege not to 
testify as their testimony would have been self- 
incriminating), Chalan summoned one of the FBI agents, and 
he confessed to the commission of the two crimes. He then 
signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights and gave a 
very specific confession to the crimes. 
Chalan argued to the trial court that some of his 
statements should be suppressed. He explained that his 
confession was involuntary because he was acting under 
coercion created by the "interview", one day earlier, at 
the governor's office. The trial court held that all his 
statements were admissible, based on several factors. The 
court not only refused to acknowledge that the "interview" 
was an interrogation but also held that Chalan was "not in 
custody for purposes of Miranda" during the questioning at 
the governor's office.71 The court maintained that Chalan 
was free to leave the governor's office at any time and was 
not held there by force or threat of force. 
Chalan attempted to express that his desire to be 
respectful and not displease the governor created a kind of 
restraint of his freedom. In other words, Chalan felt he 
was not able, or allowed, to leave. This feeling was based 
on tribal custom. The governor is the leader of the pueblo; 
he oversees the tribal council and runs the pueblo police 
7 2  force. At the suppression hearing, Chalan brought a 
cultural expert who explained, "Obedience to the Governor 
69 Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 at 1304. 
T A ~  
" Id. 
Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 at 1306. 
is expected of all tribal members."73 Chalan further 
explained that any tribal member would be expected to make 
an appearance when summoned by the governor and would not 
feel free to leave. 
Regardless of Chalan's explanation, the trial court 
held that because there was no use of physical or mental 
"pressure, threats or promises ... to coerce defendant into 
giving a statement"74 the "interview" was not an 
interrogation under Miranda. In Miranda, as quoted by the 
Tenth Circuit, an interrogation is 'questioning initiated 
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way."75 I posit that Chalan's freedom of 
action was limited in a very significant way when armed 
officers, his own mother and a local sheriff summoned him 
to the governor's office, at the governor's request. This 
was an order Chalan felt he could not ignore. He was not 
free to leave. 
In measuring the magnitude of Chalan's restraint of 
freedom of movement, the Tenth Circuit cited Berkemer v. 
M~Carty,~~ which states that a court should consider how a 
reasonable person in the suspect's situation would 
understand that situation. Given that, the court admitted 
that Chalan's 'interview" was "both coercive and 
accusatory."77 One would conclude, under the circumstances, 
this was a restraint from freedom, followed by prolonged 
accusational questioning. The interview was a police 
interrogation. Nevertheless, the trial court maintained 
that Chalan "could not have reasonably believed he was in 
custody during the inter vie^."^' Then the Tenth Circuit held 
that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous 
and stated that the officers told Chalan at the time of the 
interview that he was not being charged with a crime. 'We 
believe this information, under the circumstances of this 
interview, would lead a reasonable person to think that he 
would be free to leave."" 
73 Id. 
7' Id. 
75 Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S .  Ct. 446,612 (1996)). 
76 Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984). 
77 Chalan, at 1307. 
78 Id. 
79 Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 at 1307. 
The circuit court was unwilling to take Chalan's cultural 
heritage and custom into consideration, but was willing to 
consider Chalan's age and education, perhaps because such 
considerations worked in favor of the trial court's 
conclusion. The trial court held that Chalan was not 
'unusually susceptible to coer~ion"'~ due to his age or 
education or intelligence. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the 
trial court's conclusion. 
3. Don't worry; you just waived your rights. 
Many ambient factors come into play in assessing whether 
a waiver of one's Miranda right is valid. The results 
differ from court to court and from judge to judge. As 
stated before, a waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligently." The burden is on the government to 
prove a valid waiver, and the federal legal standard is 
preponderance of the evidence. However, under North 
Carolina v. ~utler,'~ the waiver need not be explicit but 
can be "inferred from the actions and words of the person 
interr~gated."'~ Typically, the validity of a waiver is 
determined based on the circumstances of the case; the 
facts and the specific suspect being interrogated. This is 
precisely why waivers are so convoluted and controversial. 
For example, if the suspect does not speak English well, 
doesn't know much about the American legal system or has 
specific beliefs, cultural values, mannerisms or linguistic 
disparities, the waiver process may be rife with 
misunderstandings and misapplication. While the court may 
consider unfamiliarity with American legal system, 
generally the court seems satisfied when a suspect knows 
he/she has generic rights, which "go away" upon waiver. The 
law does not expect the suspect to understand the obstacles 
created by waiving those rights. 
Under Moran v. ~urbine,'~ a waiver should be the result 
of 'free and deliberate choice" not "intimidation, 
coercion, or de~eption."'~ Thus the court looks for threats, 
physical force, or specific means of manipulation and 
coercion. This analysis supposedly ensures that the will of 
the suspect has not been strained to such an extent that 
Id. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,475-76 (1966). 
North CaroIina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,373 (1997). 
83 Id. 
" Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 564 (1987). 
85 
. Burbine, 475 U.S. 564. 
he/she has lost the ability to make decisions for 
him/herself. According to the court in Burbine, a waiver 
must be made knowingly and intelligently, with "full 
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned 
and the consequences of the decision to abandon it."86 Yet 
courts do not require that suspects know of every possible 
outcome of the waiver, but need only have a very 
simplistic, face value understanding of their rights, at 
best. 
Bernard S.: voluntary/Involuntary 
In U.S. v. Bernard 5. ," a juvenile Apache defendant 
was found guilty of assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury. He appealed to the Ninth Circuit by arguing that 
the district court was wrong in finding that he had waived 
his Miranda rights before he made inculpatory statements. 
The circuit judge held his waiver was valid. 
The assault, with which Bernard was charged, occurred 
on the San Carlos Apache Reservation. The victim sustained 
injuries to his head that required hospitalization. An 
agent named Bedford questioned Bernard at the San Carlos 
police department located on the reservation. Bernard's 
mother was present along with Lieutenant Stevens. Both the 
Lieutenant and Bernard's mother spoke Apache. Agent Bedford 
read Bernard his Miranda rights in English. Bedford gave a 
brief explanation of these rights to Bernard and his 
mother. Bernard stated that he understood these rights and 
that he was willing to waive them. According to the court, 
"He did ask his mother and Lt. Stevens to explain a few 
items into Apache, but these translations were made after 
the Miranda rights were read and waived and did not involve 
those rights."88 Bernard spoke mostly in English with the 
agent; he gave a statement confessing to the assault. 
Bernard brought a pre-trial objection to the use of 
his post-Miranda statements on the basis that they were 
involuntary and violated his Miranda rights. His objection 
was overruled, and he was found guilty. The appellate court 
reviewed the district court's opinion under the clearly 
erroneous standard as proscribed by U.S. v. Doe." Bernard 
argued that he had a very limited comprehension of English 
86 Id. at 577. . -. -. . . .  
" UnitcdStates v. BernardS., 795 F.2d 749 (9' Cir. 1986). 
Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749. 
89 U.S. V. Doe, 787 F.2d 1290,1293 (9' Cir. 1986). 
and that because his rights were not explained to him in 
Apache, he could not, for that reason, have validly waived 
his rights. He further argued that because he was only 
seventeen years old, the district court should have 
'scrutinized his confession ... with special care."90 The Ninth 
Circuit found that the district court's opinion was 
supported by substantial evidence and the determination 
that Bernard validly waived Miranda was not clearly 
erroneous. 
Still, the appellate court conceded that it was clear 
in the trial court record that Bernard did have some 
difficulty with English. At trial, Bernard had testified 
that he could neither read nor write in English, 'he 
occasionally spoke Apache with his mother and Lt. Stevens 
during the questioning to clarify some items, and he was 
assisted in his testimony at trial by an interpreter."" 
Normally the use of an interpreter at trial weighs heavily 
in the court's determination of a valid waiver. But the 
appellate court was unwilling to take these factors into 
consideration and continued; 'on the other hand, he 
admitted that he studied English through the seventh grade 
and that he answered Agent Bedford's questions in 
~nglish. "'' 
The dispositive fact for the appellate court was that 
Bernard had stated to Agent Bernard that he understood his 
rights. According to Agent Bedford, at no time did Bernard 
or his mother state that they did not understand the 
wording of Miranda or have any questions regarding these 
rights. The court concluded that regardless of his 
'language difficulties" the evidence "seemed to indicate 
that he understood his rights and voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligently waived them."93 With regard to Bernard's 
age, the appellate court applied the totality of the 
circumstance test. The court found that although age can be 
a factor in determining whether a waiver of Miranda is 
valid, the record in Bernard's case did not "indicate that 
appellant's age negated the district court's finding that 
he validly waived his Miranda rights."94 The court concluded 
by citing Doe,95 a case where the defendant was Native 
90 Bernard S., at 752. 
9' Bernard S., 795 F.2d 749 at 752. 
"Id. 
93 Id. 
94 BernardS., 795 F.2d 749 at 752. 
95 U.S. v. Doe, 787 F.2d 1290, 1293 (9" Cir. 1986). 
American, a juvenile and also from an Apache reservation. 
The court explains that in Doe, the defendant had a good 
grasp of the English language, and was "able to converse 
coherently and rationally with an FBI agent. There was no 
indication that he was... of insufficient intelligence and 
maturity to understand the rights he was waiving or the 
consequences of his waiver."96 
Terrance Frank: Knowingly and Intelligently 
In another Ninth Circuit case, U.S. v. Frank, '' 
affirmed that a 24-year-old Navajo man, who lived in a 
hogan in a very remote part of his reservation, had validly 
waived his rights and confessed voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently to his charges. Thus his statement was 
admissible in court. The circuit court maintained the trial 
court's holding, despite the fact that during the trial 
experts explained that Terrance Frank was mildly retarded, 
suffered from depression, had a low IQ and knew very little 
about the court system of the United States. Frank was 
found competent; he sought the reversal of this finding on 
appeal, but his request was denied. He also sought a 
reversal on the court's denial of his motion to suppress 
his confession. This request was also denied. 
Terrance Frank contested the admission of his 
confession on what the Ninth Circuit deemed "discrete 
constitutional  ground^."^' He argued that his confession was 
involuntary, unknowingly and unintelligently given based on 
his mental conditions, low I.Q. and on the basis that 'his 
unsophistication and unfamiliarity with the criminal 
justice system made him vulnerable to suggesti~n."~~ Part of 
Frank's contention was that he had an inadequate mental 
capacity to properly comprehend his constitutional rights 
and thus knowingly and intelligently waive those rights. 
The Ninth Circuit court reiterated and applied the 
standard set in Townsend v. sain1Oo and Moran v .  Burbine. 101 
[FN82] Both cases held that a confession that is 
involuntary or coerced is inadmissible. Both cases also 
held that a voluntary confession made without a knowing and 
% Id. 
97 United States. v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9* Cir. 1991). 
98 Frank, 956 F.2d 872 at 875. 
99 7 ,  la. 
I W  Townsend v. Sain, 72 U.S. 293 (1963). 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1985). 
intelligent waiver of one's constitutional rights is, 
likewise, inadmissible. According to the Ninth Circuit 
court, the trial record showed no sign of improper 
suggestion or coercion of Frank. For example, the police 
were very careful to explain the meaning of "coercion" to 
Frank. As the officers explained, Frank was not offered 
threats or promises. Frank was able to read his rights out 
loud and behaved cooperatively. Thus, the court concluded 
that the totality of the circumstances test had been met. 
Frank was not coerced; Frank comprehended his rights under 
Mi randa . 
However, the Government's expert psychologist 
testified at the competency hearing that Frank had only 
"Limited understanding' of the rights that are implicated 
in entering a plea of The same expert clarified 
that Frank's lack of understanding of his constitutional 
rights was due, not just to mental illness or a handicap, 
but was 'caused by the fact that as a Navajo who had lived 
on a reservation all his life, Frank had not been educated 
about the American system of justice."lo3 on cross- 
examination, a psychiatrist/expert witness for the 
Government was asked if Frank was able to comprehend his 
constitutional rights. The expert testified that Frank 
"didn't know what they meant."lo4 
In addition, a defense witness/district court 
interpreter, who specialized in Navajo, was present as an 
interpreter during a psychological evaluation of Frank. The 
interpreter illustrated many complex differences between 
English and Navajo. Many words in the English language have 
no Navajo equivalent. The interpreter used an example: the 
word "guilty." Navajo requires "two or three sentences to 
explain the meaning of this word."lo5 A \'prosecutorn 
translates as a "Washington attorney; " and "defense 
counsel" becomes "someone who negotiates or speaks for 
you."lo6 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the experts for both 
the prosecution and defense and felt that Frank was 
hindered by his "cultural  difference^."'^' Nevertheless, the 
circuit court still found that the district court 'did not 
clearly err in concluding that Frank had the mental 
Io2 Frank, 956 F.2d 872 at 877. 
I" Id. at 878. 
  rank, 956 F.2d 872 at 878. 
los Id. 
'06 Frank, 956 F.2d 872 at 878. 
'07 Id. 
capacity to comprehend his right to remain silent and right 
to counsel... and the consequences of the giving up of these 
constitutional guarantees."lo8 
The Miranda ruling and its panoply of results are 
complex and varied. Culture, language and tradition come 
into play when Miranda is applied and have a profound 
effect on the preservation and distribution of Fifth 
Amendment rights. Biases, police ineptitude, exceptions and 
ambiguities find their way into the application of Miranda 
and into the courtroom. The police still extract 
confessions from vulnerable suspects, and in the end, the 
courts maintain that a signed waiver is strong evidence 
that the waiver is valid regardless of the plethora of 
contrary facts. 
I11 
On Misinterpretation 
"Languages a r e  imbedded i n  the h i s t o r y  and  s t r u g g l e s  
of t h e  people who u s e  them. "log 
While I am aware that Indigenous languages and 
cultures are extremely complex and diverse, I posit that 
whenever two or more cultures come into direct conflict, 
and one has the political upper hand, the discriminatory 
results are often analogous.110 Similarities exist between 
tribal nations in their relationships with, and under, the 
dominant culture. Oppression through imperialism and 
conquest is easier to maintain when there is a racial or 
cultural distinction between the rulers and the oppressed, 
as evidenced by the history of indigenous people in the 
United States. Oppression can execute through language. 111 
The smallest and seemingly benign factors can add up to 
results of great magnitude. For example: inflection, 
dialect, context; all three add to the misinterpretation of 
a request for counsel under Miranda, which in turn leads to 
los Id. 
'09 Margaret Montoya, Silence and Silencing: The Centripetaland Centrifugal Forces in Legal 
Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 Mich. J .  Race & L. 847,848 (2000). 
'lo Tribes have to "transcend the ravages of colonialism, while simultaneously animating traditional values 
in contemporary circumstances." Tribes rely on tools such as "language, narrative, and the pursuit of  
justice." See Antoinette Sedillo-Lopez, Evolving Indigenous Law: Navajo Marriage-Cultural Traditions 
and Modem Challenges, 17 Ari. J .  Int'l& Cornp. Law. 283,288 (2000). The article quotes Frank 
Pommersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, Wis. L. 
Rev. 4 1 1,424 (1992). 
' ' I  Racial categorizing. .. in the courtroom depends not only on how Whites look at people of color but also 
how Whites hear people of  color. "Montoya, supra at878. 
an unjust result. The application and outcome of Miranda 
waiver cases are influenced by language difficulties, the 
mandates of suspect's culture to be obedient to the police, 
unfamiliarity with the legal system and powerlessness in 
American society.l12 A suspect's demeanor and speech may 
exhibit that lack of culturally ordained power, and acute 
sense of disenfranchisement. Oppression is harsher when a 
system is established through conquest over people with a 
different language, culture and history, and much is lost 
in translation. Much is ignored or intentionally 
manipulated for the benefit of the dominant group. 113 
The potential for misinterpretation and 
misunderstanding of Miranda is greatest for Native American 
defendants when the defendants come from remote locations 
and are entirely unfamiliar with the criminal justice 
system or their rights in the system.'14 When these 
defendants enter into interrogation-type scenarios dictated 
by powerful government agents, the results can be 
abominable (as seem by the cases in Section 11: confessions 
to crimes never committed, ineffectual efforts to assert 
rights that are never acknowledged by the police or other 
law enforcement agents and ultimately the perpetuation of 
white supremacy. The examples that follow hardly begin to 
scratch the surface of the subtleties of culture and 
language as they factor into interrogation-type situations. 
I cannot begin to attempt an even representation of Indian 
Nations, individuals from different tribes, or their 
politics and culture. I do not pretend to be an expert on 
tribal culture and various customs, but rather cite and 
pull from essays I have found helpful and instructive in 
understanding the misinterpretation and cultural disconnect 
that further isolates Native American defendants in 
interrogation settings. 
Native Alaskan Defendants in the Criminal System 
See cases mentioned in Section 11, also n. SO, supra, regarding efforts to request counsel. 
I" One is astounded in the shldy of history at the recurrence of the idea that evil must be forgonen, 
distorted, skimmed over. We must not remember that Daniel Webster got dnmk, but only remember he was 
a splendid constitutional lawyer. We must forget that George Washington was a slave owner and simply 
remember the things we regard as credible and inspiring. The difficulty, of course, with this philosophy is 
that history loses its value as an incentive and example; it paints perfect men and notable nations, but it 
does not tell the truth. " W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconrbuction, 722 (World Meridian 1964 [1935]). 
I I4 There is no other country in the world where there is such a large gap between the sophisticated 
understanding of.. . professionals and . . . and the basic education given by teachers." Marc Ferro, The Use 
and Abuse of History 225 (Rutledge and Kegan Paul 1981). 
In her extremely honest and revealing essay on Alaska 
Natives and the Criminal Justice system in rural Alaska, 
Rachel King, a public defender, notes that while her 
article is focused primarily on Alaska, "comparisons can be 
made to other situations where a traditional culture 
clashes with the Anglo legal cult~re."''~ Her article 
exposes how a legacy of conquest and subjugation of 
indigenous people continues to the present and thrives in 
the American criminal court system. King writes about 
linguistic subtleties, cultural customs and mores, which 
often go unnoticed but hinder equitable results in the 
Alaska legal system. She asserts that there is intense 
disharmony between the Native Alaskan community, partly 
because of white presumptions and expectations that abound 
in the antagonistic legal system. She maintains that many 
cultural barriers due to disenfranchisement/mistrust of the 
government and language problems go un-addressed and result 
in a break down of communication, hazardous 
misunderstanding and grave injustice. 
A look at the subtle nuance of both culture and 
language informs us of how domination and subjugation 
persevere. As King explains, "The Alaska Native defendant 
does not share the same rhetorical strategy as the players 
in the system. He is hampered both by his culture and the 
fact that he is unfamiliar with the legal system."'16 I 
assert that this is true for anyone who has not had much 
exposure to the legal system or the formal education 
bestowed upon only the privileged of America. While many, 
if not most, Alaska Natives speak English, King asserts 
that fluency does not ensure that Native Alaskan suspects 
will be able to comprehend what she refers to as "Anglo 
legal  proceeding^."^^' For many Alaska Natives, as for many 
indigenous people all over North America, English is often 
a second language. Yet even when the defendant is fluent in 
English, misinterpretation of cultural differences can 
distort understanding on both sides. For example, body 
language is easily misinterpreted. King notes that for many 
Alaskan tribes it is often considered disrespectful to make 
direct eye contact. She adds that by mainstream white, 
Euro-based standards this is considered to be strange and 
denote/connote untrustworthiness. 118 
Rachel King, Bush Justice: The Intersection ofAlaska Natives and the Criminal Justice System in Rural 
Alaska, 77 Or. L. Rev.l.2 (1998). 
King, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1 at 8. 
"'Id. 
118 King, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1 at 9. 
In addition to body language, there are many other 
contrarieties in communication, as communication styles can 
differ in a plethora of deceivingly simple ways. The 
contents, pattern and frequency of speech and the way in 
which the speaker refers to his/herself can be strikingly 
different depending on the speaker's cultural background. 
King quotes Professor Morrow, an anthropology specialist at 
the University of Fairbanks who has observed many legal 
proceedings in Alaska, "Eskimo speech patterns use lengthy 
pauses between thoughts. Anglo speech tends to be more 
hurried with shorter pauses. Eskimo speech is qualified and 
less direct than Anglo speech."'lg Furthermore, Morrow has 
noted that Eskimo defendants often reply with a "yes" or 
other affirmative response when asked if they have 
understood the proceedings, but later discussions expose 
the fact that they did not understand at all. This goes 
back to an inherent distrust of the system, a desire to be 
respectful-not get in trouble, and a general 
misunderstanding of the process and/or English language. 
Morrow also explains that "Yup'ik speech is characterized 
by numerous qualifiers, hedges, pauses, and topic shifts 
from direct answers, characteristics which rate as making 
the speaker appear less credible, certain, intelligent, and 
capable than those who use more direct constructions."120 
King cites other experts' conclusions about the 
communication patterns between native and non-native 
speakers in Alaska that lead to miscommunication. She 
insists misunderstandings are the direct result of the co- 
existence of intensely different customs, social norms and 
means of interacting, codes of conduct and decorum, and 
linguistic organization. For example, King relates to her 
readers how in Eskimo culture it is often considered rude 
to 'assert or speculate about topics."lZ1 Language is more 
indefinite and conditional. The word 'maybe", King 
explains, "is common and 'acknowledges the possibility of 
incomplete knowledge. ' "lZZ 
King also mentions that during her work as a public 
defender in Alaska she came to the conclusion that Native 
Alaskan defendants have a tendency to not assert their 
Id. at 10. 
Id. at 13. 
"I Id. 
122 King, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1 at 12. 
Fifth Amendment rights.lZ3 King believes that her Native 
Alaskan clients confessed to crimes with more frequency. 
All, but one, of her Native Alaskan clients made some form 
of confession. This was not due to culpability; these 
defendants were undoubtedly "more likely to give false 
confessions, were reluctant to be involved in conflicts 
with the accusers, and had strong cultural predispositions 
to confess . "lZ4 In addition, King explains that false 
confessions are more frequent than anyone likes to think or 
admit. She maintains that the police are more likely to 
elicit false confessions from suspects who are 
"particularly vulnerable."125 King illustrates this 
vulnerability and asserts that tribal communities, not 
unlike island cultures or small towns, promote a strong 
sense of community. There is a communal push to move on and 
to resolve conflict for the benefit of all. The community, 
not the individual, is primary. A strong sense of tradition 
and a lack of anonymity often creates a deep sense of 
responsibility and a culturally created/endorsed need to 
repair communal harmony and bring back a sense balance. 
King remembers clients who were "reluctant to contradict 
accusations made against them," and recalls statements such 
as, "Well, I don't remember if I did it, but if she said I 
did, then I must have done so."lZ6 King believes that this 
kind of response is related to a "deep seated aversion to 
direct confrontation within the Eskimo comm~nity."~~' 
Recounting her work with Eskimo defendants, King 
suggests that since aboriginal times, Eskimos have 
maintained confession to be a positive action and generally 
expected. King says this is because "Eskimo society was 
essentially noncensorious. Confession had as much of an 
aspect of news-bringing as it did alleviation of 
The inclination to confess is derived from the cultural 
understanding that 'the universe responds to human 
actions."129 If a person refused to admit or openly address 
his/her guilty actions, the absence of such communication 
could bring bad luck, ill health, problems in relationships 
and general discomfort for the community. Therefore there 
12' Id. 
I24 Id. at 2. 
Iz5 Id. at 29. 
I" Id. 
'" Id. 
128 Id. 
12' King, 77 Or. L. Rev. 1 at 29. 
is a need for repentance and reconcilement for the benefit 
of the community as a whole. 
In a culture, like Eskimo culture, that emphasizes the 
significance of community; the predisposition to confess is 
a social construct that serves to heal a fractured 
community. Perhaps it is for this reason that Alaskan 
judges and defendants alike ' rarely distinguish between 
evidentiary guilt and guilty feelings ... and generally do not 
request counsel.'130 A feeling of togetherness, or 'we-ness" 
is an overarching culture-based objective. The defendant is 
part of the community and the goal is re-integration, 
punishment is a means of educating, and the confession is 
the beginning of healing a community breach.l3l As King has 
concluded, Eskimo culture is "prone to confession." She 
also laments the conclusion that follows, "an arrested 
Eskimo is a convicted Eskimo."132 
Navajo Language: Translating the Spoken Word and Salient 
silence1" 
In an educative essay, Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of 
the Navajo Nation, explains a tradition of fear of 
coercion, intrinsic to Navajo culture. He exposes a deep- 
seated (and legitimate) distrust of attorneys, law 
enforcement and the United States legal system. He further 
illuminates how, to Navajo people, Western concepts of 
guilt are inscrutable and illogical. In Navajo culture 
there is a saying that one should "beware of powerful 
beings."134 As Honorable Yazzie explains, this saying is 
derived from Navajo ethics where coercion is considered 
disreputable. Coercion is 'so feared in Navajo ethics that 
the invocation of powerful beings ... is a form of coercion 
considered to be ~itchcraft."'~~ Witchcraft is a crime 
punishable by death under Navajo common law. Given the 
history of the United States and the great chasm between 
Western moralistic ideology and Navajo tradition and 
philosophy, Yazzie explains that general distrust of the 
American legal system is exhibited in Navajo vocabulary. In 
Navajo, lawyer or " 'agha 'dii t 'aahii" is one who "takes 
"I Id. at 3 1. 
Id. 
I" "If we do not speak of it, others will surely rewrite the script." See George Swiers, as quoted in William 
A leman Williams et al., eds., America in Vietnam ix (Norton 1989). 
l3YP Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes from it": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 NMLR 175 (1994). 
Id. at 180. 
away with Within its meaning is the description 
of a person who uses deceptive words for duress. The entire 
Euro-based Western legal system is viewed as potentially 
coercive and oppressive. 
The Navajo definition of guilt requires a long 
explanation, as exemplified by the case of Terrance 
Frank. 13' When a Navajo member goes before a judge and is 
asked in English "Are you guilty or not guilty", according 
to Yazzie, "a Navajo cannot respond because there is no 
precise word for 'guilty' in the Navajo language."'38 Yazzie 
explains that the word "guilt" suggests 'a moral fault 
which commands retribution."'" In Navajo the word is 
nonsensical, because Navajo law focuses on healing a 
breach, promoting integration and "nourishing ongoing 
relationships with the immediate and extended family, 
relatives neighbors and community."140 Yazzie notes that 
judges of other Indian nations have reached similar 
conclusions with their languages. He adds that guilty plea 
rates for Native people are very high in state and federal 
courts. 
Often, it isn't what people say, or the language they 
use, but what remains unsaid that reveals a great deal 
about culture and heritage. Margaret Montoya discusses the 
use of silence in her essay specifically on silence and 
silencing. She argues, 'One's use of silence ... is related to 
one's culture and may correlate with one's racial 
identity. "14' Montoya cites the work of Keith Basso, who 
cultivated a study on silence. Ultimately, Basso concluded 
that silence is contextual. Silence is used differently in 
different scenarios and is dependent on the 'social roles 
of the persons involved in the communication and their 
status in relation to each other." 14' Basso analyzed the 
use and cultivation of silence in Navajo communities. He 
studied silence in the Navajo Peacemaking process. He found 
the use of silence in Navajo communities to be similar to 
136 King, 7 Or. L Rev. 1 at 185. 
'I7 United States. v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872 (9' Cir. 1991). 
Yazzie, 24 NMLR 175 at 182. 
Id. 
140 Yazzie, 24 NMLR 175 at 182. In order to restore hozho (harmony) though the fundamental concept of 
k'e, which reinforces clan relationships among hadane (in-law relationships) based on reciprocal 
responsibility, the notion of treating others as your relatives is strongly maintained. To behave poorly is to 
act as if you have no relatives. 
"I Margaret Montoya, Silence and Silencing: The Centripetal and Centr@gal Forces in Legal 
Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 Mich. J .  Race & L. 847 (2000). 
I42 Montoya, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 847 at 865. 
that in Apache communities. "Navajos used silence, aware 
of the 'power of words' while non-Navajos were likely to 
conclude that silence signaled a breakdown in 
interaction. "143 
As Montoya writes, "the negative valuation of 
(silence, or) the slow talker is based on the fast talker's 
perception that s/he has nothing to say or is unwilling to 
speak, while the fast talker gives the slow talker the 
impression of crowding out others."144 From this negative 
valuation stem stereotypes seen in American culture 
describing and depicting Native people as slow, sullen, 
quiet, stupid or uncooperati~e.~~~ 
The Subtext of Legal Discourse and the Preservation of a 
Racist System 
In the same essay, Montoya maintains that language is 
stratified in ways we do not discuss. Montoya believes that 
there is a communication barrier between social and 
professional language. For example, in the case of U.S. v. 
Doherty,ld6 were Doherty stated that his mother was securing 
a lawyer for him. He believed he was requesting an 
attorney, but in the legal realm, his request was 
ambiguous, asserted at the wrong time and essentially of no 
value.14' Thus his language yielded no power. Montoya warns, 
"The logo centric14' privileging of 'voice' can colonize the 
very differences we seek to recognize."149 This is precisely 
why, in reality, the application of Miranda does not work 
to promote justice but instead precludes it. For example, 
Miranda was created to recognize and to protect vulnerable 
suspects' Constitutional rights against self-incrimination 
and ensure suspects the right to an attorney. However, when 
Doherty asserted that his mother was securing an attorney 
and believed that he was asserting his right to an 
143 Id. 
I" Id. at 863. 
145 Montoya, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 847 at 864. These stereotypes are rampant in our school systems as well. 
'There is not one Indian in the whole of this country who does not cringe in anguish and frustration 
because of these textbooks. There is not one Indian child who has not come home in shame and tears." 
Rupert Costo, in Miriam Wasserman, Demysrifing School 192-93 (Praeger 1974). 
146 US. v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6Lh Cir. 1997). 
Id 
14' Logo cenhic: log or logo- from the Greek logos meaning: word: thought: speech: discourse -centric 
from Medieval Latin -centricus or centrum center 1: having a center or centers 2: having (something 
s ecified) as its center. 
' Montoya, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 847 (2000). (Citing Chinese Wornen Traversing Dimpora: Memoirs, 
Essays and Poetry, by an Asian American Race Crit, Sharon Hom, ed. 1999). 
attorney, his efforts and voice were not recognized under 
the objective standards used in applying Miranda. 
Ironically, Miranda does not shield the people who need 
protection the most. In some respects, Miranda merely 
provides a procedural stamp of approval-an okaying that 
allows statements into court. 
Montoya establishes that language used in legal 
discourse is calculatedly "unitary." By refusing to 
acknowledge or accept heter~~lossia'~~ into the legal system 
in a country made up of a richly heterogeneous populous, 
the mainstream rejects "languages and silences of 
subordinated groups, such as people of color, sexual 
minorities, and others who have been historically 
oppressed."15' This rejection of heteroglossia is part of 
the maintenance and cultivation of the law of white- 
privilege and what Montoya refers to as "traditional legal 
discourse." This discourse reaffirms and aids the status 
quo by reiterating the doctrines of Mainstream, Euro-based, 
white-culture and supremacy and silences the voices of 
minorities. This process serves to 'centralize power and 
privilege within the hands of those dedicated to 
maintaining the status It is the handing down of 
magic words, 153 and the book of secret codes. The result is 
continued ethnocide and legally sanctioned oppression. 
Montoya expounds on her theory that people of color 
are kept silent by the mainstream. I assert that people of 
color are also forced to speak in a system that intends to 
preserve its power and authority. Minorities are denied 
access to the special words that invoke their 
Constitutional rights in being denied equal access to 
quality education in a system requiring "unitary language 
with a controlled and limited set of rneaning~."'~~ As long 
as education continues to fall short in America, meanwhile 
150 Heteroglossia: heter- or its variant hetero- comes from the Middle French or Late Latin from the Greek 
heteros; akin to Greek heis one 1: other than usual: other: different 2: containing atoms of different kinds. 
gloss- or glosso- from Latin, from Greek gloss-, glosso, or glossa. 1: tongue 2: language. "Heteroglossia" a 
word used in Margaret Montoya's essay, borrowed from Mikhail Bakhtin, and early 20' Century Russian 
literary critic. See Montoya, at 851-52. 
''I Montoya, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 847, 851. (2000). 
Is* Id. at 852. 
See n. 50 supra for more examples of Native American defendants not having access to the "magic 
words." Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61,63 (1996) (holding "Do you think I need a lawyer?" was not an 
unambiguous request) also, Lord v. Duckworth, 29 F.3d 1216, 1220-21 (7" Cir. 1994) (holding that "I can't 
afford a lawyer, but is there any way I can get one?" was not an unambiguous request for counsel). Not 
everyone is an Oxford don. 
154hlontoya, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 847 at 853. 
law schools churn out more attorneys indoctrinated into 
traditional legal pedagogy, the result will be a widening 
of the rift between many defendants and those running the 
legal system.155 In will also be the continued promulgation 
of a group of law enforcement, professionals, judges and 
lawyers, who are oblivious to the sub-text of race and 
inequality, rampant within our legal system and its 
procedures. The preservation of this Euro-based system 
promotes/requires the refusal of other voices by 
cultivating objectivity. It requires magic words, as the 
hierarchy depends on them. It also depends on the limited 
distribution of certain words by refusing decent education 
to minority citizens and the poor of this county. 
Montoya delves further and expresses that the legal 
system creates spaces for permitted silence such as the 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. What she 
leaves out is that this silence is privileged and can only 
be invoked if one knows the correct language, ordained by 
old, white, male judges to summon the rights created by the 
Fifth Amendment. Part of racial privilege is choosing who 
gets to speak and when, as well as who is taught the 
language, the secret codes, subtle nuance and magic words. 
Silencing of race is one of the principle mechanisms for 
maintaining the ideology of white supremacy.156 One's 
precision with language can determine the scope of one's 
rights. 
Montoya believes that silencing works on two levels: 
the micro and macro level. The micro level applies to 
incidents in which race is arguably relevant, but are 
resolved with a resolute inattention to, and silencing of, 
racial aspects. The case U. S. v. Chalan 157 best exemplifies 
the micro level, where the court refused to acknowledge 
that a reasonable pueblo Indian would have believed he was 
in custody when summoned to the governor's office. The 
macro level, according to Montoya, determines how areas of 
the law are defined and how disciplinary and professional 
worldviews are formed. An example would be the legal 
standard of an "unambiguous request for counsel" and what 
passes under the Court's criterion as a valid request. 
155 
"America is a secular society, where law is characterized as rules laid down by human elites for the 
good of society. The Navajo word for law is beehaz'aanii. It means something fundamental, ad something 
that is absolute and exists from the beginning of time. Robert Yazzie, "Life Comesfrom it": Navajo Justice 
Concepts, 24 NMLR 175 (1994). 
156 Montoya, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 847 at 892. 
Is' US. v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302 (10" Cir. 1987). 
34 
White domination is perpetuated by systemically maintaining 
a world/legal view, in which race is not relevant "and 
therefore does not have to be discussed, especially by 
those legal actors-judges, prosecutors, legislators and 
lawyers- who make and enforce rules by which this society 
is regulated and governed."lS8 
Native Americans are often denied justice, robbed of 
their rights or kept silent in different ways. Language 
plays a substantial part in denying and achieving justice 
and power. Words, body language and cultural perception are 
complex, hold multiple meanings and resonate in different 
ways; they are heavy with significance and intention. 
Language promotes a collective agreement that certain 
issues are not to be discussed, and a sub-textual agreement 
to keep others out. 
IV 
What has been done & what can be done? 
Courts have made a gradual effort to incorporate 
defendants' cultural backgrounds into a totality of the 
circumstance test. Some courts do take cultural background 
into consideration when determining the admissibility of a 
confession.159 However, there has not been much importance 
placed on cultural factors or cultural experts. Though 
courts have discretion to include and admit the testimony 
of cultural experts, most courts still resist.160 The United 
States Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue of 
cultural background and cultural experts despite the trend 
of bringing cultural and language issues into both state 
and federal courts and the demographics of the American 
population. 
The Ninth Circuit has used an approach they refer to 
as 'the 'refined' objective standard." This is an objective 
test applied in custody analysis. The notion is that when 
police officers know of a subjective factor, like a 
suspect's unfamiliarity with the American system, this 
subjective element can be considered in determining whether 
the suspect was in custody at the time of interrogation. 
This new standard originated in the U.S. v. Beraun-Panez 
Montoya, at 892. 
159 James J. Sing, Cultures as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and Culture in the 
Criminal Law, 108 Yale L.J 1845 (1999). 
160 See Id. generally. 
opinion.161 In this case the police had threatened the 
defendant, an alien, with deportation and held him in 
isolation after they discovered he was unfamiliar with the 
English language. The Ninth Circuit held that Beraun-Panez 
was in custody when confronted and questioned by the 
police. The test applied by the court was "how would a 
reasonable person who was an alien perceive and react to 
the remarks of the 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a step in the right 
direction, but it will take time for other courts to 
evolve. In the meantime, it is critical that education be 
improved in this country. Children of every ethnic and 
economic background need-and deserve-to be educated about 
the Constitution and how its mandates apply to their lives. 
I once heard a story on NPR about medical students teaming 
up with songwriters to create catchy tunes for children in 
Central America. The idea was to encourage hygiene and 
promote overall health. It wouldn't be difficult to write a 
few songs for kids that remind them of their rights. They 
would never forget the songs, I guarantee. On the theme of 
education, I also call upon the Native American legal 
community for more Critical Race literature. As Margaret 
Montoya expresses, 'We must learn to talk about the deep 
issues in law and culture, to openly debate them rather 
than smother them in silence."163 
Police must also be better educated. For example, 
Canada is implementing sensitivity training for all people 
employed by the criminal justice system, who work with 
Native Canadians. Cross-cultural training is slowly 
becoming required of police, lawyers, judges, probation 
officers and correctional officers. Canada has also made an 
effort to hire Native Canadians as court personnel in order 
to protect Native defendants rights within the system.164 
The United States should require some kind of cultural 
competency training. While a course or weekend workshop can 
only do so much, ongoing training could make a substantial 
difference. Proper interrogation training is also 
essential. "Shoddy police practice derives in large part 
16' United States v. Beraun-Pana, 812 F.2d 578,581 (9" Cu. 1987). amended by 830 F.2d 127 ( 9 ~  Cir.
1987). 
Unitedstates v. Beraun-Paner, 812 F.2d 578,581 (9' Cu. 1987), amended by 830 F.2d 127 (9' Cir. 
1987). 
Margaret Montoya, Silence and Silencing: The Cenhipetal and Centrifugal Forces in Legal 
Communication, Pedagogy and Discourse, 5 Mich. J .  Race & L. 847 (2000) at 894. 
164 Rachel King, Bush Justice: The Intersection of Alaska Natives and the Criminal Justice System in Rural 
Alaska, 77 Or. L. Rev.1, 55. (1998). 
from poor interrogation training.16= As the American 
criminal justice system has yet to create proper safeguards 
to prevent police manipulation, psychological subterfuge 
and police induced false confessions. The education of 
police officers is imperative. 
Videotaping interrogations is also es~entia1.l~~ The
risk of misinterpretation and police misconduct would be 
substantially limited if the police were required to 
videotape interrogations. A recording of an interrogation 
could provide an objective and exact account for the court 
to review. A video could help determine whether a suspect 
knowingly and intelligently waived their rights, assess a 
custodial situation and clarify whether the defendant was 
under formal interrogation. Videotaping would also allow 
for the court to view a suspect's request for counsel, and 
furthermore, determine whether a waiver was coerced or 
freely made. Alaska and Minnesota both require videotaping 
of interrogations. Other states should follow their lead. 
In addition, counsel should be required at all 
interrogations. The pedantic recitation of Miranda does not 
prevent unethical police practice and fails to protect 
suspects from police misconduct. If a lawyer were present 
throughout every interrogation, there would be a balance of 
power that would deter misconduct and ultimately help 
suspects exercise their rights. Also, interpreters should 
be made available, and if requested an interrogation should 
not continue until a licensed interpreter is present. In 
short, Miranda rights should read "You have the right 
remain silent, you have the right to an attorney during 
this questioning and any other proceedings, if you cannot 
afford an attorney one will be made available for you, you 
have the right to an objective, and unbiased interpreter 
during this questioning and any other proceeding." 
Conclusion 
The Miranda opinion had a profound impact on criminal 
procedure in this country. Miranda aimed to protect 
Richard A. Leo and Richard A. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty 
and Miscarriages ofJusfice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J .  Crim. L. & Criminology429, 
429. (A carefnl study of sixty cases of "police-induced false confessions the post-Miranda era.) 
166 See Stephen J. Shulhofer, Miranda. Dickerson, and the k z l i n g  Persistence of Fifth Amendment 
Exceptionalism, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 941 (2001). 
suspects who are stripped of power, dignity and control, 
and to clarify the role of the police and their behavior. 
However, the Supreme Court's blurring of the Miranda rule 
in subsequent opinions, and the Court's refusal to consider 
the cultural composition of the United States, has made the 
law difficult to follow and has allowed lower courts, 
police and prosecutors to ignore the rights of criminal 
defendants. Miranda does not achieve what it set out to do, 
and it does not create restrictions on interrogation 
practices once the suspect waives his/her rights. In fact, 
Miranda often harms the people it was fashioned to protect 
as the courts deem Miranda a "protection" and thus are able 
to procedurally presume that all statements made after 
Miranda warnings are legitimate, event though they are 
often as illegitimate as pre-Miranda interrogations. The 
whole thing is a farce, under the guise of providing 
protection. Thus Miranda is insincere and deceitful. All 
over the United States, courts have been forced to deal 
with cultural factors like heritage, language and 
familiarity with the legal system in their application and 
interpretation of Miranda. The results have been 
problematic. 
It is critically important that attorneys, judges, 
scholars and police officers be sensitive to culture and 
language in the interpretation of confession law and the 
application of Miranda. We cannot erase racism, it is alive 
and thriving in our system, it is the foundation of our 
system. It will not be removed as easily as a bumper 
sticker, and donning a bumper sticker will not change it. 
For now, we should do more to protect the rights of 
citizens in this country and strive to keep dialog alive, 
meaningful and accessible. This is precisely why I removed 
my bumper sticker, as I have come to realize that no matter 
how much I wish injustice wasn't rampant in this country, 
merely "erasing" it could never solve the problem. 167 
In conclusion, I should mention that this discussion 
is not limited to Native Americans in the United States. 
Anyone who waives his or her Miranda rights and makes a 
1 6 7 ~  History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, and it faced with courage, need not be lived 
again." Maya Angelo, from "The Pulse of Morning" a poem written for the Clinton inauguration, January 
20, 1993. Implicit in the American 'melting pot myth' is the notion that immigrant or foreign cultures 
should blend into the fabric of American society.. . The underlying assumption is that white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant values define the identity of the United States. This assumption, however, negates the identity of  
Americans that so not belong to the majoritarian group, and ignores the historical reality of the diversity of 
cultures defining the true American identity." 
statement or admission is more likely to be prosecuted, 
less likely to be dismissed, convicted more often and 
punished or sentenced more often. Those who confess are 
less likely to go before a grand jury and less likely to go 
to trial. Confessions are treated as 'damning and 
compelling evidence of guilt ... likely to dominate all other 
case evidence and lead a trier of fact to convict the 
defendant.16' Even though confessions can be as faulty as 
eyewitnesses' statements and the results can be 
substantial, recurrent and devastating. The police "induce 
false confessions so frequently that social science 
researchers, legal scholars and journalist have discovered 
and documented numerous case examples in this decade 
a10ne.l~~~n 'I did it" statement substantially overpowers 
any evidence of the defendant's innocence. The worst part 
is that there are studies that show innocent people are 
more likely to waive their Miranda rights. 170 
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